More and more companies are publicly taking a stand on social and political issues such as gay marriage legislation. This paper argues that this type of engagement, which can be called "corporate political advocacy", raises new conceptual and normative challenges especially for theories of corporate responsibility. Furthermore, it poses practical challenges for managers who are confronted with it. This paper addresses all three challenges: first, it defines and conceptualizes corporate political advocacy and distinguishes it from other forms of corporate political involvement. Second, it makes normative sense of corporate advocacy as an element of corporate responsibility. Third, it reflects on the practical implications for managers dealing with this issue.
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In the year 2009, the ice cream producer Ben & Jerry's temporarily changed the name of their best-selling Chubby Hubby ice cream flavor into Hubby Hubby in order to celebrate their home state Vermont's decision to issue marriage licences to same-sex couples. While Ben & Jerry's certainly were known for their outspoken social activism, it was rather unique for a company to take such an overt political stand for something as controversial as gay marriage at that time.
Walt Freese, then CEO of Ben & Jerry's, commented on their decision as follows: "At the core of Ben & Jerry's values, we believe that social justice can and should be something that every human being is entitled to." Furthermore, "(f)rom the very beginning of our 30 year history, we have supported equal rights for all people. The legalisation of marriage for gay and lesbian couples in Vermont is certainly a step in the right direction and something worth celebrating with peace, love and plenty of ice cream." 1 While Ben & Jerry's way to express their support for gay rights was probably the most creative one, they were not the first company to engage on that matter. A year before, the battle over Proposition 8 in California which aimed to constitutionally restrict marriage to heterosexual couples had already provoked statements from corporations like Google and Apple who both explicitly argued against the proposition.
In the meantime, corporate engagement for gay marriage has become even more widespread.
2 Perhaps most prominently, the Seattle-based coffee chain Starbucks has publicly thrown its weight behind gay marriage legislation in Washington State. Confronted with fierce opposition in form of the "Dump Starbucks" campaign by gay marriage opponents, Starbucks' efforts were endorsed by the Human Rights Campaign, USA's largest lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender civil rights organization. In a statement printed in the Seattle Times, Kalen Holmes, 3 Starbucks' Executive Vice President commented on the company's pro-gay marriage campaign in Washington State: "Starbucks strives to create a company culture that puts our partners first, and our company has a lengthy history of leading and supporting policies that promote equality and inclusion. This important legislation is aligned with Starbucks business practices and upholds our belief in the equal treatment of partners. It is core to who we are and what we value as a company." 3 In 2013 a total of 278 companies filed an amicus brief to the Supreme Court expressing their opposition to the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). 4 Beyond the US context, Google's gay marriage campaign "Legalize Love" is particularly remarkable by targeting not only legislation in its home country but also in host nations where such efforts have so far been unsuccessful or absent. Examples are Singapore or Poland.
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While the corporate movement to support gay rights is certainly the most visible and the most divisive one in regard to companies openly taking a political stand, it is by far not the only one. Similar trends can be observed, for example, in the environmental arena, where corporations are becoming increasingly proactive in promoting more effective regulation to fight climate
change. Yet, as we will argue in this paper, there is something distinctive about the type of political engagement underlying the corporate support of gay rights, namely its proactive character, its focus on values and ideals and its reliance on public advocacy, rather than on conventional lobbying strategies that often occur behind closed doors. In this contribution we will analyze this specific form of corporate political involvement and label it corporate political advocacy.
Despite its rather momentous implications for both theory and practice, corporate political advocacy has so far not been singled out as a phenomenon that warrants scholarly scrutiny in its own right in the field of business ethics and related debates. We will argue that 4 corporations' engagement in political advocacy poses new conceptual, normative and practical challenges. In our article, we aim at addressing all three challenges. In a first step, we will define corporate political advocacy by distinguishing it from other, perhaps more familiar forms of corporate political involvement. We will then attempt to get a better conceptual grasp of this new corporate political advocacy by reflecting it in the context of the established discussions on
Corporate Political Activity (CPA) and political CSR. In a third step, we will then try to make normative sense of it by reflecting on it through the lens of corporate responsibility. Lastly, we will conclude our paper with some remarks about the practical implications that derive from our elaborations for managers dealing with this issue in practice.
Defining Corporate Political Advocacy
In the following paragraphs, we will attempt to define corporate political advocacy as exemplified by the corporate engagement for gay marriage by distinguishing it from other, related forms of corporate political involvement.
Etymologically, advocacy derives from the past participle of the Latin verb advocare, which means to summon assistance. Also contained in the term is the Latin word for voice (vox).
Thus, advocacy can be understood as the act of promoting and voicing support for an "individual or organization, or idea" by trying to persuade "targeted audiences to embrace this individual, organization or idea" (Edgett, 2002: p. 1 it would do so even if it was engaged in an entirely different sector. We believe that a third aspect is characteristic for this new type of political engagement: while it is inherently political in nature, it always at least partially takes place outside formal political channels. That is, it is always also addressed to and made visible for a larger public, rather than exclusively to formal political institutions and agents.
Based on these three dimensions, we can differentiate advocacy from three other kinds of corporate political involvement. Before we do so, however, it is important to point out that the distinction between those four categories is ideal-typical. That is, in practice, the boundaries between them might often be blurred and corporate political advocacy is unlikely to be found empirically "in its conceptual purity" with which we present it (Weber, 1963: p. 398 ). In practice, as will become evident in our conclusions, corporate political advocacy must always be assessed in relation to the overall 'political character' of corporations in order to count as a consistent, plausible and authentic type of political engagement. However, defining the idealtype of corporate political advocacy provides the ground for singling out the specific conceptual and normative challenges linked to it.
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Most distinctively, corporate political advocacy is different from what we call "classical lobbying" which is mainly discussed in the literature on Corporate Political Activity (see below).
In a nutshell lobbying is an activity, "by which corporations attempt to shape government policy in ways favorable to the firm" (Baysinger, 1984; quoted from Hillman et al., 2004: p. 838 Frank Act mandates supply chain due diligence for minerals sourced from conflict areas and to make this information publicly available. Thus, the driver for this kind of political engagement is clearly the economic self-interest of corporations which implies that the subject of lobbying are always matters that are closely related to a company's core business. While lobbying certainly can generate win-win situations in which the self-interest of corporations coincides with the public interest, the primary driver of lobbying undoubtedly is the corporation's endeavor to improve its competitive position in the market (Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2013) .
Moreover, lobbying typically happens behind closed doors and thus lacks the voice-element which is constitutive for advocacy.
Lobbying can be justified based on either the argument that corporations have a right to free speech, which has recently been reaffirmed in the Citizens United ruling by the US Supreme Court, or based on the argument that "corporations are citizens and as such are permitted-and perhaps not only permitted but also required-to be active participants in the political process because they can contribute to social welfare" (Alzola, 2013: p. 5 ). Yet, there is widespread suspicion that in many cases, lobbying more than anything represents an abuse of corporate 7 power (Den Hond, Rehbein, Bakker, & van Lankveld, 2013) . It is feared that lobbying not only threatens political economic systems and undistorted markets but democracy in general (Barley, 2007) . As a consequence, scholars in business ethics have frequently called for the introduction of ethical standards for corporate lobbying (Christensen, 1997; Oberman, 2004; Stark, 2010; Tian, Gao, & Cone, 2008) . This leads to the second category of political involvement of companies, which can be called ethical or responsible lobbying.
Ethical lobbying subjects lobbying practices to certain standards of conduct. It does not question the legitimacy of lobbying as a means to advance the company's self-interest as such, but it subjects it to standards with regards to how such self-interested goals can be pursued. Thus, it shares the close connection to the company's business strategies with the definition of classical lobbying. In practice, the main drivers of ethical lobbying, thus understood, are professional associations of lobbyists, whose historical purpose it is to establish and advance lobbying as a profession and thus to lay down certain ideals and standards in codes of ethics that are specific for the profession. For example, the national professional association American League of Lobbyists requires its members to uphold their Code of Ethics for lobbyists. 7 Professional lobbyists, as the Code reads, "have a strong obligation to act always in the highest ethical and moral manner in their dealings with all parties." The Code is aimed at the "highest ethical conduct" of lobbying professionals "in their lobbying endeavors", but always within the given context and premise of lobbying as a vehicle of advancing particular corporate interests. In fact,
to "vigorously and diligently advance and advocate the client's or employer's interests" is one of the very principles laid down in the Code. Based on this premise, then, lobbyists are asked to "conduct lobbying activities with honesty and integrity ", which includes truthfulness in communication and the provision of "factually correct, current and accurate information"; they 8 ought to "comply fully with all laws, regulations and rules applicable to the lobbyist" and "conduct lobbying activities in a fair and professional manner"; they should "treat others -both allies and adversaries -with respect and civility" and never "act in any manner that will undermine public confidence and trust in the democratic governmental process".
The third category, which Peterson and Pfitzer (2009) labeled "lobbying for good", goes a step further than ethical lobbying (see also Keffer and Hill's communitarian approach to lobbying (1997) ). It subjects not only the lobbying strategies, but also the underlying purpose and objectives of lobbying to ethical scrutiny; pure self-interest as the underlying normative driver of lobbying is rejected. Thus, lobbying for good denotes a company's adoption of common (ethical) lobbying strategies not primarily for the advancement of its own financial interests but for the promotion of social policy, public goods such as health or education (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Valente & Crane, 2010) and basic rights Wettstein, 2009) . It is based on the premise that businesses, with their connections and their proficiency in using their influence, are often better equipped and better positioned to advance social change then individuals or other institutions, including non-profits (Peterson & Pfitzer, 2009: p. 46 ). This is why various authors have called for a closer integration of companies' lobbying efforts into their CSR strategies (Peterson & Pfitzer, 2009; K. A. Rehbein & Schuler, 1999; Vogel, 2008b) . "It is not enough for companies to engage in sophisticated private initiatives, however strategic," says David Vogel (2008b: p. 41) , "they must also be willing to support public policy that makes it easier for them and other firms to do the right thing. Without government support, many socially beneficial corporate programs will have limited impact". Reasonable as this proposition sounds, the reality still looks different today. Even companies which have addressed the social and environmental impact of their business practices often support legislation that stands in sharp 9 contradiction to their CSR efforts (Peterson & Pfitzer, 2009) . Their main focus, as Peterson and Pfitzer (2009: p. 48 ) point out, is still on avoiding irresponsible lobbying practices (i.e. on ethical lobbying) rather than on proactively lobbying for good policy. Vogel (2008b) distinguishes two general motivations for why corporations may lobby governments for the promotion and adoption of "good social policy." First, they might hope to achieve a first mover advantage over their competitors and thus benefit financially from it. Since this interpretation is instrumental it may be little more than a classical or an ethical lobbying strategy with a beneficial side-effect. Second, they might hope to protect their social engagements from competitive downward pressures exerted on them by less responsible competitors. Only this interpretation represents lobbying for good in its true sense, since the concern for social responsibility rather than the corporation's financial interest is identified as the primary motivation. Companies which integrate corporate social responsibility and lobbying assume a "political-regulatory responsibility" (Ulrich, 2008: p. 414 ). This means that instead of shrugging their shoulders at the impossibility of living up to their proclaimed responsibilities as corporate citizens under "given competitive conditions", they "initiate ethically justified reforms of the institutional framework" (Ulrich, 2008: p. 414 ). In other words, "(e)ntrepreneurs and top managers who are really interested in company policies with a high social and economic potential for the consideration of values consequently recognize their share of responsibility… for the ethical quality of the 'rules of the game' and the regulatory framework under which they wish to play the 'game of competition'" (Ulrich, 2008: p. 414 as an attempt to bind the laggards in the industries to the same standards and thus to advance fair competition on more responsible grounds.
In sum, while this third category of political involvement still depends on a link between the issue in question and the core business operations of the company, it is, in contrast to classical and ethical lobbying not conducted exclusively based on a self-interested rationale, but always also aimed at the advancement of the common good. This dissolving link between lobbying efforts and corporate self-interest characterizes lobbying for good as a precursor to
advocacy or as what we could call a weak form of advocacy.
Having introduced these three types of political engagement of corporations allows us to finally illustrate what we mean by corporate political advocacy. In advocacy the connection to 11 the corporate purpose and activity that characterizes the different types of lobbying described above dissolves further. Thus, corporations which engage in advocacy expose themselves politically on issues without any direct and overt relation to their core business operations. We "While we respect the strongly-held beliefs that people have on both sides of this argument, we see this fundamentally as an issue of equality. We hope that California voters will vote no on Proposition 8 --we should not eliminate anyone's fundamental rights, whatever their sexuality, to marry the person they love."
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With its explicit 'value-based' language, Google's statement represents a case of corporate political advocacy as we define it. Google seems to have a similar take on it, perceiving its engagement as taking a public position on a social issue, which is placed outside of its core business field:
12 "As an Internet company, Google is an active participant in policy debates surrounding information access, technology and energy. Because our company has a great diversity of people and opinions --Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and liberals, all religions and no religion, straight and gay --we do not generally take a position on issues outside of our field, especially not social issues. So when Proposition 8 appeared on the California ballot, it was an unlikely question for Google to take an official company position on. However, while there are many objections to this proposition --further government encroachment on personal lives, ambiguously written text --it is the chilling and discriminatory effect of the proposition on many of our employees that brings Google to publicly oppose Proposition 8." 12 (emphasis added) This is not to say that there is no such thing as a (legitimate) 'business case for gay marriage'. In fact, many companies prefer to defend their advocacy for marriage equality based on economic rationales. For, example, in a discussion on Minnesota Public Radio on the question "should businesses take a stand on marriage amendment", 13 John G. Taft, CEO of RBC Wealth Management, argued that the marriage amendment has negative effects on the climate for business and on the long-term competitiveness of the state of Minnesota. According to Taft, businesses have a direct interest in marriage equality simply because they depend on inclusive and diverse environments both for the recruitment of the best talent as well as for understanding the ever-increasing diversity of the markets they serve with their products and services. 14 We have now outlined and distinguished four kinds of corporate political involvement and identified the characteristics that are defining of corporate political advocacy. In the 13 following section, we will attempt to make conceptual sense of corporate political advocacy, by reflecting on its ties to some closely related fields.
Conceptual Challenges: Embedding Corporate Political Advocacy Conceptually
Conceptually, corporate political advocacy is most closely related to the fields of Corporate Political Activity (CPA) (see, e.g. Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Getz, 1997; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Schuler, 1996; Windsor, 2007) and "political CSR" (see, e.g., Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) . However, neither of these two trains of thought seems to be able to embed political advocacy adequately. As we will show, corporate political advocacy is located both beyond the explanatory scope of CPA and beyond the concepts of legitimacy underlying political CSR. Thus, in the following paragraphs, we attempt to develop a better conceptual understanding of corporate political advocacy by delineating it in more detail from these two related fields.
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Corporate Political Activity (CPA): The term "Corporate Political Activity" emerged in the 1980ies in management research and focused on corporate strategies to shape and influence government policy (see, e.g., Hillman et al., 2004: p. 838) . 16 In contrast to corporate political advocacy as defined above, CPA focuses on companies becoming politically engaged only for the purpose of advancing their own interests. Corporate political action, from that point of view, is seen as the advancement of private interests through engagement and involvement in collective decision-making processes (see Moon et al., 2005: p. 436 ).
In an early paper, Keim and Zeithaml distinguish between different strategies which CPA encompasses, such as constituency building, campaign contributions through a political action committee, advocacy advertising, lobbying and coalition building (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986) . For 14 obvious reasons, lobbying and advocacy advertising are of particular interest to this paper. We have addressed the distinction between corporate political advocacy and "classical" lobbying as a part of our (negative) definition of the concept above. Advocacy advertising, on the other hand, is "concerned with the propagation of ideas and the elucidation of controversial social issues of public importance" (Sethi, 1979: p. 70) . If the primary interest and motivation behind such advocacy advertising was actually to promote the public good, it would be closely aligned with our definition of corporate political advocacy. However, not surprisingly, CPA assumes that corporations engage in such advocacy advertising merely for their own sake, that is, in order not to create public, but private value for the firm.
Thus, traditional CPA research has hardly engaged with implications of their field relating to ethics and responsibility. However, one of the leading CPA scholars, Douglas A.
Schuler, has acknowledged mounting criticism about this one-dimensional focus of CPA. He has diagnosed a "preponderance of 'contemporary' scholarship on corporate political activity" that focuses on "how corporate political activities can create private value for the companies that use them" (Schuler, 2008: p. 164 ). Schuler has admitted that as a consequence of this instrumental rationale informing CPA, "other effects" like those relating "to the economy, democracy, or justice, are ignored" (Schuler, 2008: p. 164) . Similarly, Oberman (2004: p. 248-49) has argued that "(t)he objective of recent CPA research has been to describe and conceptualize business political activity as a strategic response to the environment, not to question or seek to limit that response." As a result, Oberman (2004: p. 248-49) proposed that "it would seem that this research stream has reached a sufficient level of maturity that normative considerations can be entered into the mix." Yet, despite such aspirations, so far there is no coherent theory for the specific context we are interested in. 15 In sum, corporate political advocacy shares with CPA the interest in the influence that corporations exert on politics and thus a focus on power-or pressure-based political activity. Yet, advocacy obviously runs counter to CPA's assumption that such political activity ought to directly and immediately promote the corporation's own economic interests. Unlike a typical CPA scenario in which corporations lobby behind closed doors for their own interests, advocacy exposes corporations publicly and on issues which are of no direct relevance to their economic interests. Granted that reputational considerations can never be entirely ruled out (e. g. we do not claim that Ben and Jerry's decision to get engaged was entirely free from business considerations) 17 , but our notion of advocacy applies to activities where it is safe to assume that the 'business case' has not been their primary or even the sole driving factor. though not all scholars who contribute to the debate have explicitly or uniformly endorsed it (e.g. Moon et al., 2005; Matten & Moon, 2008; Néron, 2010; Néron & Norman, 2008a; 2008b) .
Political CSR gains relevance "against the background of emerging governance institutions and procedures beyond the nation-state" (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007 : 1108 . It focuses on the role and responsibility of corporations within such 'new forms of governance' such as public-policy networks or multi-stakeholder initiatives. Thus, in contrast to CPA, this debate highlights the political role of corporations predominantly in the 'extraconstitutional' sphere 16 (Baur, 2011) . As such, the focus of political CSR tends to be narrower than that on corporate political advocacy, which takes place both within (lobbying for the good) and outside (advocacy in a weak sense) of the constitutional sphere. Concordantly, it seems that political CSR cannot fully integrate corporate political advocacy, which raises questions about the compatibility of the conceptual assumptions underlying the two concepts. In particular we need to assess whether corporate political advocacy can be reconciled with political CSR's concept of legitimacy.
The key concern of political CSR is the legitimacy of corporate political activity rather than merely its instrumental utility, which clearly sets it apart from CPA. For that purpose, some scholars in the field, such as Andreas Scherer and Guido Palazzo (2007) , have combined the political model of deliberative democracy with (normative) stakeholder theory. Within deliberative democracy, legitimacy is understood to result from undistorted communicative processes involving all relevant stakeholders. Thus, corporations as legitimate political actors are asked in such models to openly participate in such public processes of political will formation (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007 : p. 1108 . This evidently runs counter to the inherent opaqueness of corporate lobbying as portrayed by CPA as well as its aim of advancing the corporation's own interest over that of the public.
Like political CSR, also corporate political advocacy must be conceptualized as an activity beyond the promotion of narrow economic interests. Furthermore, like political CSR, also corporate political advocacy rests on the assumption of overt, rather than hidden political engagement of corporations. Yet, the specific notion of legitimacy underlying political CSR seems to clash with the aim and purpose of corporate political advocacy. Rather than subjecting their CSR to scrutiny within critical multi-stakeholder dialogues, corporate political advocacy seems to require the company to abandon its deliberative attitude in favor of a forceful and public stance for particular values or ideals. Thus, while political CSR tends to call for embedding the corporation in inclusive and holistic deliberation processes and for the balancing of stakeholder interests therein, political advocacy aims at the exposure of the corporation beyond such processes and at the partial and at times confrontational promotion of certain ideals and causes over others. Stakeholder dialogues, which are seen to be the prime mechanism for the consideration and balancing of competing stakeholder claims and which, therefore, are constitutive for the understanding of legitimacy in political CSR, may play a rather subordinate, if any, role for corporate political advocacy. To the contrary, corporate political advocates may be willing even to override this legitimacy requirement and promote specific ideal causes without their prior legitimization in broad stakeholder deliberations. 18 Thus, at the heart of corporate political advocacy is a form of public favoritism and a reliance on the use of power, which political CSR is precisely concerned with rooting out.
Thus, corporate political advocacy seems to require a notion of legitimacy beyond stakeholder theory. While stakeholder theory did not start out necessarily as a normative approach (Walsh, 2005; Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, & De Colle, 2010; Donaldson & Preston, 1995) , it is one of the predominant theories on which CSR scholars rely for the justification of "moral or philosophical guidelines for the operation and management of corporations" (Donaldson & Preston, 1995: p. 71 ). Yet, obviously, as stated above: corporate political advocacy may not rest on the impartial consideration and balancing of stakeholder interests. Instead it implies the pursuit of normative convictions potentially in favor of some stakeholders over others. A necessary normative condition for the advocatory pursuit of causes and ideals outside any stakeholder processes seems to be that those causes represent "valid claims regardless of whether or not they affect the stakeholders of the corporation" (Baur & 18 Palazzo, 2011: p. 582). Such claims are based on norms whose violation can be considered wrong "for reasons prior to any stakeholder obligation" (Phillips, 2003: 30 We believe that a conceptualization of corporate political advocacy as an integral part of a company's CSR is possible nevertheless. However, doing so requires us to adopt a different starting point for our reflections on corporate responsibility; we must shift our perspective away from a company's core business activities and processes to a company's core values, that is, we must replace the dominant activity-based view of CSR with a more holistic value-driven view.
Based on it, we must understand CSR as embedded in and expressed through corporate character (Love & Kraatz, 2009 ) and culture (see e.g. Goodpaster, 2007) .
Such a shift in perspective corresponds to Basu and Palazzo's (2008) insight that not the assessment of the content of more or less isolated activities along the value-chain ought to be at the center of CSR research, but a deeper examination of corporate character. Corporate character,
then, is examined in terms of its fundamental integrity, that is, in terms of the consistency between what a company thinks (fundamental values), what it says (communication of values),
and what it does (concrete, value-driven behavior) (see e.g. Basu & Palazzo, 2008: p. 125 ; see also Ciulla, 2005) . Similarly, in her seminal article "Managing for Organizational Integrity", Lynn Paine (Paine, 1994: p. 107 ) has argued that integrity approaches "strive to define companies' guiding values, aspirations, and patterns of thought and conduct". Thus, integrity 20 approaches give life to the organization's values in a proactive manner (Paine, 1994 your values is a discipline we are just learning to master." (Hollender, 2004: p. 115-116) A focus on organizational integrity helps at least explain why and how certain business decisions and behaviors such as political advocacy may be linked to and indeed derive from the character of a company and thus fit with its overall CSR approach (Basu & Palazzo, 2008 Lundbeck's opposition against the use of its drug in executions contains certain elements of advocacy. Nevertheless, the company's engagement did not aim at the abolishment of the death penalty as such, but "merely" at not becoming personally involved in its execution through the provision of the necessary drugs. In other words, the company is concerned predominantly with the avoidance of becoming complicit in the execution of inmates, rather than with advocacy against the perceived larger injustice behind the institution of the death penalty as such.
Therefore, its supply restrictions first of all serve the purpose of doing no harm through their business operations, rather than of advocating for broader social change. 24 In order to count as advocacy in the sense of this article, the company would need to expose itself publicly by taking a stand against the death penalty in general. 25 Despite the dissolving link between advocacy and a corporation's core business, as well as its focus beyond the "mere" avoidance of harm, corporate political advocacy is not to be confused with corporate philanthropy. There certainly are instances where the lines between these two concepts may blur. For example, both philanthropy and advocacy can be understood to represent "the most voluntary and discretionary dimension of corporate responsibility" (McAlister & Ferrell, 2002: p. 692 ) and philanthropy, just like advocacy, is equally conceivable without any positive correlation with the corporation's financial interest. Moreover, depending on the specific cause that is supported, philanthropy can certainly be considered an activity of political relevance, just like advocacy. Nevertheless, there are crucial differences between the two concepts. Most importantly, philanthropy lacks the "voice" element that is characteristic for advocacy. By definition, advocacy is based on the vocal promotion of values and ideals rather 24 than merely on their support through financial means. Thus, in order to amount to actual advocacy, philanthropic contributions by corporations would have to be complemented with vocal and targeted attempts by the company to publicly promote the respective causes.
To depict corporate political advocacy as a part of corporate responsibility is not uncontroversial and it almost certainly raises objections and concerns. In the following we will briefly address what we believe may be the most common ones among them.
Common Objections to Corporate Political Advocacy
We are aware that the issues we raise are rather controversial. We have collected some reactions and questions from discussions among ourselves and with colleagues in order to address them in this paper. Doing so should clarify further both the conceptual nature of advocacy as a political activity as well as its ties to corporate responsibility. We will address four objections to the idea of corporate political advocacy: the first one deals with the alleged intrusion of ideology in the economic realm; the second one addresses the problem of alienation among stakeholders; the third one raises doubts about the underlying motivation of companies; the fourth and perhaps most difficult one raises the question whether companies should be allowed to throw their weight behind anything they prefer, that is, whether any value can be a basis for legitimate corporate advocacy.
Intrusion of ideology:
As a response to Ben & Jerry's 2009 announcement to change the name of its Chubby Hubby ice cream, The Guardian blogger Oliver Thring contemplated that "It seems you can't fill a shopping basket these days without also buying into some sort of ideology." 26 His reaction seems representative for what a lot of people may think about corporate political advocacy. Ideology, values, and morality still seem not to be appropriate avenues for 25 corporations to take a position on. Implicitly, Thring's message is that businesses should keep going about their business and keep their hands off anything else. However, one may justifiably ask whether this view indeed represents today's corporate reality. The idea that the market itself is free of ideology and that, by following its dictates, corporations are somehow operating in a value-free zone is about as removed from the ordinary as Thring thinks of corporate political advocacy (see e.g. Ulrich, 2008; Werner, 2012) . Robert Cox (1985: p. 207 ) rightly claimed that "(t)heory is always for someone and for some purpose"; it always has a perspective and cannot be divorced from "a standpoint in time and space." Thus, economic theory itself is based on distinct values; the call for free markets, for example, is itself based on ideology, and very often, it is endorsed also by companies. Thus, we have never had a shopping basket which was free of ideology. What is new, perhaps, is that today we are seeing businesses embracing other types of ideologies and values and that they are promoting them overtly and in novel channels rather than exclusively behind the closed (revolving) doors of KStreet. The difference for us as consumers, investors, or employees, however, is not as big as Thring makes it seem. To the contrary, it
seems that knowing what companies actually stand for provides us with a conscious choice to buy from, work for, or invest in those companies whose values align most closely with our own.
Therefore, rather than holding on to the illusion of value-neutrality in business, we should make use of this choice. This leads to the next point. response to the last objection also applies to this point. That is, the alienation of certain stakeholders based on the values of corporations is nothing new, but has always been a part of business. For example, a commitment to productivity and efficiency as has been found to be included in a notable amount of corporate mission statements (Kaptein, 2004 ) is likely to favour the discrimination of people with disabilities. The same goes for the systemic preference given, for example, to young over old, male over female, childless over family and so on.
Moreover, it is nothing new that companies follow specific missions and visions and also the adoption of corporate value statements is by now nothing out of the ordinary anymore. By definition, any company who claims to be on a mission is espousing a specific value set. A mission cannot be value-neutral -it is inherently normative. Thus, any mission statement bears in it the potential of alienation. In many cases, stakeholders who disagree with a company's values are free to either 'exit' their relationship to the company or to 'voice' their disagreement, or to do both (Hill & Jones, 1992) , as happened in the case of JC Penney. What is striking, however, is that we have come to uncritically accept the pursuit of market shares as a set ideal, rather than asking companies to come up with more meaningful statements of their ambition.
However, anyone who talks to people working for such organizations on a regular basis knows that while some employees support the one-dimensional pursuit of profits, others do not (Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006) . Literally every company faces value pluralism among its stakeholders. There are people on all levels of the organization who are opposing the 27 stereotypical corporate mindset. Thus, companies which explicitly espouse other values in addition to the purely monetary ones are providing us with a valuable choice. Beyond our dependence on some kind of employment and consumption for the satisfaction of existential needs, it is up to us to choose the companies with whose mission and values we identify -as employees, customers, and investors; and companies in return often deliberately rely on values in order to attract certain customers, employees or shareholders (Maignan, Ferrell, & Ferrell, 2005) .
Thus, companies cannot and do not even strive to be liked by everyone, because they are inherently value-driven institutions and, as such, they always appeal to some, but not to others.
This last point connects to the third objection, which addresses the motivation behind corporate political advocacy.
It is all about the business case: this objection raises doubts about whether there is in fact such a thing as corporate political advocacy as defined in this paper. Anything the corporation does, such is the argument, is based on its impact on the bottom line. Corporate advocacy is not an exception. Thus, any company which advocates for certain values or ideals only does so if it expects this to be beneficial financially. Our response is as follows: As we have argued above, it is true that many companies which promote the legalization of gay marriage, are doing so not exclusively based on a concern for equal rights, but also based on, financial motives. However, to claim that advocacy conducted by companies, can be boiled down to the exclusive concern for the bottom line simplifies the matter about as much as claiming that financial interest never plays any role. As so often, the truth of the matter may be found in between the two extremes. Similar to their engagement for CSR in general, most companies engaging in political advocacy may do so based on mixed motives (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Brenn & VidaverCohen, 2009; Brown, Vetterlein, & Roemer-Mahler, 2010; Graafland & van de Ven, 2006 Thring makes a fair point about the danger of hypocrisy when it comes to corporate advocacy either in favor of or against one's own values. However, the benchmark for the legitimacy of a company's advocacy must indeed be the most basic ethical principles of equal human dignity and moral worth of all human beings. In order for advocacy to be a part of corporate responsibility, it cannot espouse discriminatory and exclusionary ideals, it cannot take a stand in favor of bigotry and intolerance and it cannot diminish the equal fundamental dignity of all human beings. The problem that we face is that as a benchmark, these principles are rather broad and fuzzy and they leave much room for interpretation.
A relatively recent paper on ethical consumerism by may provide some more conclusive insights on this question. Hussain argues that for consumers to legitimately use their bargaining power in the market as a mechanism of social change, they must adopt a view on their activism as a legislative endeavor and thus as a part of the wider political process. He calls this the proto-legislative approach to ethical consumerism. As a consequence such ethical consumerism for the advancement of social change is permissible only if it is consistent with the broader justifying aims of our liberal democratic order . More specifically, it is legitimate if the exercise of bargaining power does not, among others, deprive other human beings of their fundamental freedoms, if it advances an agenda framed in terms of a reasonable conception of the common good, if the process that guides the exercise of bargaining power generates standards and arguments that can be the basis of future legislation, and if the overall aim of the effort is to raise awareness for the issue and to put it on the formal legislative agenda . It is beyond the scope of this paper to spell out similar criteria for corporate political advocacy. However, we believe that a similar argument can and must be made for corporate political advocacy as Hussain advances for his proto-legislative account of ethical 31 consumerism. If corporate political advocacy is to be considered permissible or even worthwhile in a liberal democracy, it cannot aim at values and ideals which contradict the very foundations of such a liberal democracy, else it would pull the rug from under its own feet.
Conclusion: Practical Challenges of Corporate Political Advocacy
Our time has been described as one of shifting and blurring lines between private and public, economic and political (see e.g. Kobrin, 2009; Mathews, 1997; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) . Under Managers who are confronted with questions of political advocacy arguably face a thorny issue with potentially significant implications for the company as a whole. How should they decide whether to publicly take a stand on a specific issue of concern? We suggest that there are three basic conditions to a legitimate advocacy campaign, which managers should assess thoroughly and sincerely before making a decision to throw the weight of the company behind a specific cause. They are consistency, plausibility, and authenticity; all of them are cornerstones of a company's integrity. This is confirmed by Waddock and Rasche (2012: p. 83 ) who assert that "companies that wish to operate with integrity must articulate positive and constructive values to guide their behavior."
Consistency
Plausibility: A company's advocacy for a specific cause becomes plausible only, if it is part of and embedded in a long-term strategy to promote specific values or causes. Google's "love campaign" is a fitting example for this point. Rather than "merely" taking a stand on a specific referendum in a specific state, Google has made the promotion of gay rights a focal point of its international corporate responsibility. Any specific activity on the promotion of gay rights can thus be placed within this campaign and thus gains plausibility as a constitutive part of their overall corporate responsibility.
Authenticity: This point is closely connected with the first two. A company's advocacy for a specific cause must be embedded in a concerted set of actions to promote the respective cause. In other words, the company needs to show that it supports the causes it is advocating for not only through words but through targeted action also in its own operations. The legitimacy of a company's advocacy can never be assessed in isolation of the rest of its activities and indeed of the very culture and character of the company.
Hence, the question at the core of this new trend to corporate political advocacy is not so much whether it is an appropriate corporate activity in general. Rather, the question is whether
companies have earned what Sethi and Williams (2000: p. 197) call their "right to advocate", that is, whether their advocacy efforts appear as credible in light of their stated philosophy and 33 their lived culture and thus can legitimately be pursued as a part of their corporate responsibility.
In the context of corporation's role in apartheid South Africa and the respective stipulations advanced by the Sullivan Principles, Sethi and Williams stated the following:
"The large corporation must become an active agent for social change if it is to make the world safe for democracy, and indeed, for capitalism… As a dominant institution in society, the corporation must assume its rightful place and contribute to the articulation of the public agenda and [not] simply react to policy choices advocated by others. The right of advocacy, however, cannot be taken for granted but must be earned through public trust in corporate intent and faith in corporate promises made in the name of "public interest." (Sethi & Williams, 2000: p. 197) Trust in corporate intent and faith in corporate promises can build only over time and only if a company lives and promotes its values authentically and consistently. Thus, the right to advocate can be earned only through integrity.
Notes

